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Abstract. Transportation costs are of central importance in the New Economic 
Geography literature, though assumptions about transportation costs continue to be 
simplistic.  This paper begins to address these simplifications by assuming that 
transportation costs for manufactured goods are heterogeneous.  Basic results are 
consistent with standard models showing dispersion of economic activity for high 
transport costs and eventual agglomeration as transport costs decline.  However, several 
novel features arise too.  Many unstable, dispersed equilibria exist for high average 
transport costs, but converge to a stable equilibrium path as transport costs decrease.  
Equilibrium paths smoothly transition from dispersion to agglomeration and do so at an 
increasing rate.  Additionally, transport costs directly influence firms’ location decisions 
and firms spatially sort by transport cost. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the role of transportation costs in 
New Economic Geography (NEG) models by specifically modeling firms with 
heterogeneous transport costs in an NEG framework.  There are two main reasons to 
examine this situation: 1) transport costs play a critical role in NEG models and need to 
be explored in more depth and 2) products in the real world clearly have different 
transport costs.  
In general, NEG models examine how the spatial distribution of economic activity 
changes as transportation costs slowly decline.1  The slow decline is meant to mirror the 
actual decline in transportation costs observed over the modern era of civilization.  As 
transportation costs fall, firms are able to export goods more cheaply and thus become 
less tied to immobile factors as sources of profit.  This sets off a circular causality 
between mobile firms and mobile consumers.  Each find it in their best interest to locate 
where the other exist, leading to agglomeration of all mobile economic activity.  
NEG models generally have two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture, and 
typically all firms in manufacturing have identical transport costs and agricultural 
commodities are costless to trade.  Given the importance of transportation costs in NEG 
models, several papers explore alternative assumptions (e.g. costly agricultural transport, 
Davis (1998); tariffs versus trade liberalization, Puga and Venables (1999); congestion 
effects, Lanaspa and Sanz (2001)).  More related to the current paper, Alonso-Villar 
(2005) extends Venables’s (1996) model to allow the transport cost of final 
                                                 
1
 The seminal papers are Krugman (1991) and Venables (1996).  Neary (2001) and Fujita and Mori (2005) 
offer good reviews.  
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manufacturing goods to differ from that of intermediate manufacturing goods.2  She finds 
that the spatial distribution of firms can evolve in completely opposite ways depending 
on which of the two transport costs decrease.  Amiti (1998), though not using an NEG 
framework but closely related, analyzes a model with two countries which differ in size 
and two manufacturing industries which differ in transport cost.  She finds that the large 
country specializes in the production of the high transport cost good in order to have 
access to the larger market without paying shipping costs.  
Common sense suggests that different goods have different transport costs in the 
real world.  Hummels (2001) clearly demonstrates just this by calculating average freight 
charges for 2-digit SIC codes for several countries.  In general, however, there is a dearth 
of empirical research in this area.  Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue this is 
because “direct measures [of trade costs] are remarkably sparse and inaccurate.”  As a 
result, estimation strategies that measure aggregate trade costs for an entire country or 
time period are necessary, such as a gravity model.   
The purpose of this paper is to determine the effects of assuming that each firm 
pays a different export cost in an NEG framework.  Do traditional results of 
agglomeration and dispersion still hold?  Does agglomeration occur all at once 
(catastrophically) for a threshold transport cost or more smoothly and why?  Does a 
firm’s transport cost influence its location decision and why?  I  address these questions 
using a linear footloose entrepreneur model, which comes from a variation of the linear 
model by Ottaviano et al. (2002) proposed and solved by Baldwin et al. (2003).3  There 
                                                 
2
 Rossi-Hansberg (2005) takes a similar approach in a non-NEG setting. 
3
 Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) first introduced the footloose entrepreneur model, though they use a setup 
more akin to Krugman (1991).  Pflüger and Südekum (2008) offer a synthesis of footloose entrepreneur 
NEG models. 
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are two regions, two sectors, and two types of labor, entrepreneurs and laborers.  
Entrepreneurs work in manufacturing and are mobile across regions, whereas laborers are 
immobile and work in both sectors.   
Several other papers introduce heterogeneities into NEG models for interesting 
results.  Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003) assume consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences over levels of an exogenously set public good.  Zeng (2008), 
on the other hand, examines a situation in which consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences over privately consumed goods.  All three papers conclude that the 
heterogeneities act as a strong dispersion force and can cause segregation of consumers 
by preferences. 4  In an entirely different vein, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) assume firms’ 
productivity is heterogeneous and show how a process of selection can overstate 
econometric estimates of the benefits to agglomeration.  
 The results of the present model prove to be a fruitful extension of the standard 
framework as well.  Like the standard results, the distribution of firms is dispersed for 
high transport costs and agglomerated for low transport costs.  However, multiple 
unstable equilibria exist for high transport costs and, as transport costs decrease, the 
equilibria converge to one of two stable equilibrium paths which tend toward 
agglomeration smoothly.5  No stable equilibrium exists for high transports costs and only 
stable (and agglomerated) equilibria exist for low transport costs. 
                                                 
4
 Alonso-Villar (2008) offers a nice discussion of how results such as these are driven by a combination of 
two separate dispersion forces.  In the three papers mentioned, there is the standard demand-pull dispersion 
force from the immobile laborers/farmers as well as the heterogeneous preferences that act as an additional 
dispersion force.  Alonso-Villar (2008) produces a bell-shaped distribution pattern – i.e. dispersion for low 
and high transport costs and agglomeration in between – by introducing consumer congestion costs into a 
standard framework that already includes a demand-pull element. 
5
 Several other papers have produced results with smooth equilibrium paths (e.g. Puga 1999).  
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In addition, firms sort and segregate themselves by transport cost creating a high 
transport cost region and a low transport cost region.  The bifurcation does not develop 
immediately, but once firms are sorted they remain that way.  Agglomeration always 
occurs in the region which establishes itself as the low transport cost region. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the model, discusses the 
entrepreneurs' key role and motivations for their location decisions, and defines 
equilibrium and stability concepts.  In section 3, I describe how numerical methods are 
used to solve the model.  I discuss and illustrate the results in section 4, and also explain 
the causes and effects of the opposing agglomeration and dispersion forces.  Section 5 
concludes.  
 
II. Model  
 There are two regions, Home (H) and Foreign (F).  Each region has two sectors, 
which will be referred to as Agriculture and Manufacturing.6  There are two inputs to 
production: entrepreneurs and labor.  There are N entrepreneurs total; they only work in 
manufacturing and are mobile across regions.  The L laborers, on the other hand, work in 
both sectors, are immobile across regions and are evenly split between regions.  
 There are two goods in the economy corresponding to the two sectors.  The 
agricultural good is homogenous and is produced using constant returns to scale 
technology under perfect competition.  Additionally, all individuals are endowed with a 
positive amount of this good.  
                                                 
6
 These names are more for expositional purposes than truly representing those sectors.  It is most 
important that we accept that there are production inputs which are mobile or tradable and inputs which are 
not.  
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The second good, manufactures, is a composite of N horizontally differentiated 
manufacturing goods.7  The market for manufactures is described as monopolistic 
competition, where each firm supplies a differentiated product.  N is large such that each 
firm has a negligible impact on the market.  However, aggregate market conditions, 
specifically the price index of a region, do affect demand facing a firm.  All interactions 
between firms are non-strategic and there is free entry into the market.  All firm profits 
are equally distributed to all residents of a region.  
Individuals are either entrepreneurs or laborers; both earn wages for their labor 
that they supply inelastically.  Regardless of their type, all individuals are consumers and 
have identical preferences, which are described by the quasi-linear quadratic utility 
function  
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where iq  is consumption of the i
th
 manufacturing good and Aq  is consumption of the 
agricultural good.  In the utility function, α expresses the intensity of preferences for a 
differentiated product, δ measures the substitutability of the goods (higher δ, closer 
substitutes), whereas β>δ implies that consumers prefer variety.  The budget constraint 
for a consumer, given wages y and initial endowment 0q , is  
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 Usually, the number of goods is considered to be a continuum instead of a finite number.  The usual 
assumption ensures that firms earn zero profit in equilibrium.  However, if this model allowed for a 
continuum of firms and free entry, then only those firms with the cheapest transport costs would remain in 
equilibrium.  This result does not match reality where firms survive based primarily on consumer demand, 
not their transport cost.   In this model, one of the factors of production, entrepreneurial talent, is scarce and 
it is by this means that each firm earns zero profit in equilibrium.  
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where Hip  is the price of manufactured good i in region H, HAp  is the price of the 
agricultural good in region H, and Hcπ  is the individual share of profit.  Prices are region 
specific such that the budget constraints of the two regions are usually not the same.  I 
will refer to prices (and any variable in general) in Home with an H superscript and prices 
in Foreign with an F superscript.  The equations written here are from Home’s 
perspective, but equations for Foreign could easily be written in the same manner. The 
endowment 0q  is large enough such that 0>Aq  for all consumers in equilibrium.  After 
solving the consumer maximization problem and making a change of variables, the 
demand for a single manufacturing variety can be written as 
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HP  is referred to as the price index.   
An expression for indirect utility is derived by substituting the demand equations 
into the utility function: 
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 The technology available to both regions is identical.  The marginal labor 
requirement of Agriculture is denoted 0>Aa .  Since there is perfect competition in this 
sector, the agricultural good sells for marginal cost, that is HLAHA wap =  and FLAFA wap = .  
Further, this good can be traded between the regions without incurring transport cost. 
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Thus, arbitrage guarantees that prices equalize, FAHA pp = .  I let agriculture be the 
numeraire good so that 1== FAHA pp .  This implies that nominal wages for labor are 
A
F
L
H
LL awww /1=== ; real wages depend on the price index.   
Manufacturing production requires a fixed cost of one entrepreneur and labor is a 
variable input.  Each entrepreneur is associated with a given manufacturing good and that 
good’s corresponding transport cost.  A firm’s product and transport cost is determined 
by the entrepreneur that it hires.  Each firm needs 0>Ma  units of labor for each unit of 
output.  The total cost of production for firm i producing iq  units is iLMi qwaw +  where 
iw  is the wage of the i
th
 entrepreneur.  The cost structure implies increasing returns to 
scale at the firm level.  Firm i can export one unit of its product to the other region for a 
positive cost of iτ  units of the numeraire good, where iτ  accounts for all impediments to 
trade and does not depend on the location of the firm.  Transport costs are uniformly 
distributed over range R (i.e. NiNRii <∀=−+   /1 ττ ). 8    The profit of a firm located in 
Home is  
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The firm sets prices for its product in Home )( HHip and in Foreign )( HFip .  The first letter 
in the superscript denotes where the product is manufactured and the second denotes 
where it is consumed.  If the firm was located in Foreign, it would instead set prices FFip  
                                                 
8
 The manner in which τi is distributed does not substantially affect results.  All that really matters is that 
there is an ordinal relationship between firms; this should become clear when the results are discussed in 
section 5. 
 9
and FHip .  HS  and FS  are the sizes of the market (number of consumers) in Home and 
Foreign, respectively.  If there are HN  entrepreneurs in Home and FN  in Foreign, then 
HH NLS += 2/  and .2/ FF NLS +=   No arbitrage opportunities exist as long as 
i
HH
i
HF
i pp τ+≤ , which holds true in equilibrium.  
Entrepreneurial talent is a scarce resource and because there is free entry for firms 
entrepreneurial wages are bid up to the point that profit equals zero for all firms.  I denote 
the portion of profit excluding entrepreneurial wage for firm i in region k as 
).~ (i.e. ~ kkk iiii w−= πππ   Thus, an entrepreneur will choose a location where k~iπ  is 
maximized, all else equal.  I refer to this aspect of location preference as the profit effect.  
iπ
~
 differs by location because of differences in the magnitude of consumer demand, the 
market access effect, and differences in the level of competition, the market crowding 
effect.  Also, iπ~  is different for different entrepreneurs because transport costs are 
heterogeneous, ., and , ~~ kk FHkNjijiji =∈∀<⇔> ττππ  
Since entrepreneurs are also consumers, they also base their location decisions on 
local prices of manufacturing goods.  The consumer effect, or cost of living effect, is the 
aspect of location preference that describes how an entrepreneur responds to differences 
in consumer welfare between the two regions.  Consumer welfare is defined here as the 
portion of indirect utility derived from the consumption of manufactured goods.  This 
effect is driven by consumer preferences for variety and motivates the entrepreneur to 
locate where prices are lowest and they can consume the most.   
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An entrepreneur chooses a location by weighing the benefits of each location 
from both the perspective of a consumer and a profit maximizer.  Formally, entrepreneur 
i chooses location k where  
(6)                                                                       .   ),~,,...,(maxarg 01
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Wage is simultaneously determined with location such that .~ kiiw π=   The interaction 
between the profit effect and the consumer effect drive the results of the model and will 
be discussed more in section 4 with respect to specific results.   
 Short-run equilibrium is defined as a set of prices and allocations such that firms 
maximize profit, consumers maximize utility, and all markets clear.  In the long term, 
entrepreneurs are able to relocate to the other region.  I assume that all agents are myopic 
and seek to maximize current welfare.  The law of motion that describes the aggregate 
migration of entrepreneurs is as follows: each period, rank from most to least the welfare 
gains each entrepreneur would receive by relocating and allow the top θ% to move, the 
remainder of entrepreneurs do not move that period.9  A long-run equilibrium is defined 
as a short-run equilibrium in which no entrepreneur wishes to move.  A long-run 
equilibrium is stable if a small permutation in the distribution of firms does not cause the 
equilibrium to change.  
 
III.  Solving the model 
 The first order conditions from the profit maximization problem can be used to 
solve for a firm’s optimal prices in each location. 
                                                 
9
 The law of motion places a constraint on Equation 6 above, namely that in order for entrepreneur i to be 
given the choice of location, their welfare differential must be in the top θ%.  In equilibrium, equation 6 
holds for all entrepreneurs.   
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Clearly, each firm’s optimal prices depend on the price indices.  However, the price 
indices are a function of each firm’s price.  Thus, these equations must be solved 
simultaneously.  When each firm has an identical transport cost, this problem reduces to 
solving a six-equation system.  With heterogeneous transport costs though, it would be a 
system of 2(N+1) equations.  I use numerical approximation to determine prices; profit 
and welfare levels follow directly from prices. 
 I simulate the model as follows.  Given a starting distribution for the firms, the 
program solves for prices, which then indicate welfare levels.  The program then checks 
for each entrepreneur if they individually would be better off in the other region, all else 
equal.  Then the law of motion chooses which entrepreneurs migrate.  Once again, prices 
and welfare are calculated for the new distribution of entrepreneurs.  This iterative 
process is repeated until no single entrepreneur has the incentive to migrate.  The 
resulting distribution is an equilibrium.  Next, the stability of that equilibrium is tested.  
One at a time, each entrepreneur is switched to the opposite region and the iterative 
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process of finding an equilibrium is repeated with the slightly perturbed equilibrium 
distribution as the starting distribution.  If the resulting equilibrium is the same as the 
original equilibrium for every one-entrepreneur-perturbation, then the equilibrium is 
stable.  All of this analysis is done for a single distribution of transport costs.  Next the 
transport costs are uniformly lowered and the process of finding an equilibrium and 
checking its stability is repeated.  The process is repeated for a range of transport costs 
until a complete equilibrium path is mapped out.  An equilibrium path is a record of all 
equilibria for various transport costs stemming from a given initial distribution.   
 
IV.  Results 
The results are consistent with standard NEG models with homogenous transport 
costs.  For high average transport costs, relatively equal dispersion of economic activity 
is observed, whereas for low average transport costs, agglomeration is observed.  
However, several novel features arise.  For high average transport costs, many equilibria 
exist, all of which are close to symmetric dispersion and unstable.   As average 
transportation costs decline, the multiple equilibrium paths converge to a common, stable 
path.  Equilibrium paths smoothly transition from dispersion to agglomeration and they 
progress to complete agglomeration at an increasing rate.  Finally, as average 
transportation costs decrease, entrepreneurs spatially sort themselves into high and low 
transport cost regions. Agglomeration always occurs in the region which establishes itself 
as the low transport cost region.   
I discuss in detail below the major features of the model as well as explain the 
results in terms of the interaction between the profit effect, a dispersion force, and the 
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consumer effect, an agglomeration force.  Tension between dispersion and agglomeration 
forces is universal in NEG models.  Transportation costs determine the relative strength 
of the two forces and agglomeration eventually dominates dispersion as transportation 
costs decline.  In my model, not only does the relative importance of the two effects 
change as transport costs change, but the relative importance is different for each 
entrepreneur leading to differences in behavior.  
From now on, I will use the terms firm and entrepreneur somewhat 
interchangeably.  Regardless of whether I am discussing an entrepreneur or a firm 
migrating, it is always the entrepreneur’s welfare that drives location decisions. 
Figure 1 illustrates characteristic equilibrium paths.  Refer to the Appendix for 
parameter values used to generate this graph and further details on the simulation.  The 
dotted lines represent unstable equilibrium paths and the solid lines represent stable 
equilibrium paths.  Note that not all equilibrium paths are graphed; more equilibria exist 
for high average transport costs.  They are not shown because 1) the proportions are not 
significantly different (or different at all) than equilibria displayed and 2) they would 
clutter the diagram.  Two equilibria can have identical proportions of firms in one region 
and still be different because of the heterogeneities in the model.   
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Figure 1.  Characteristic equilibrium paths with heterogeneous transport costs.  Dotted lines represent 
unstable equilibria and solid lines represent stable equilibria. Refer to the appendix for details of the 
specification.   
 
  The results are generally consistent with those from standard homogenous 
transport cost models.  For high levels of transport cost, the equilibrium paths all have 
approximately or exactly an equal share of firms in each region.  For low levels of 
transport cost, the only equilibria are agglomerated.  However, there are important 
differences in the results that demonstrate the richness of the addition of heterogeneous 
transport costs.   
IV.a.  Multiple equilibrium paths  
There are many equilibrium paths for high levels of transportation costs and all of 
the equilibria are unstable.  To a large extent, these paths are sensitive to the initial 
distribution, though only up to a certain point.  As transportation costs decline, the 
equilibrium paths converge and initial conditions become irrelevant.  However, 
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equilibrium paths also exhibit hysteresis.  In the event of a trade cost reversal, 
equilibrium paths do not necessarily retrace the paths they took when costs were 
declining.  Unlike the hysteresis of Krugman (1991) though, if trade costs reversed 
direction the new equilibrium path would still have approximately the same distribution 
of firms as the old path.   
Many dispersed equilibria exist because, when average transport costs are high, 
the profit effect dominates the consumer effect and demand is predominantly local.  First, 
since average transport costs are high, the price levels are high resulting in a large 
demand for locally made manufactures.  Firms locate such that they can maximize their 
share of the profit opportunities, which means locating away from other firms.  When 
every firm has this motivation, dispersion results.  Second, exporting goods is expensive 
for all firms and so firms are primarily competing with firms in the same region.  Firms 
are heterogeneous only in their transport cost, meaning that for a given region all 
manufacturing goods are sold at the same domestic price.  These two facts imply that one 
firm is virtually a substitute for another leading to multiple equilibria with similar 
proportions of firms, but with one or more firms swapping locations.   
The many dispersed and unstable equilibria converge to a stable equilibrium as 
average transport costs decline because demand becomes more inter-regional.  As exports 
become a more viable source of profit, firms are no longer a substitute for one another.   
Some firms are more apt to deal with local competition than others and these differences 
render slight permutations on an equilibrium untenable.  
IV.b.  Smooth transition to agglomeration 
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The transition between equilibrium distributions is almost always smooth as 
transport costs decrease.  Standard results often show that there exists a critical transport 
cost at which the stable equilibrium suddenly switches from dispersion to agglomeration.  
My results do not exhibit this catastrophic agglomeration property as dispersed equilibria 
continuously transform to agglomeration equilibria as transport costs lower.  As a result, 
a full spectrum of distributions of firms is observed, whereas the standard results only 
offer three distributions, 0, 0.5 and 1.0 over the entire range of transport costs.  Further, 
entrepreneurs relocate at an increasing rate as transportation costs decline.10  The one 
exception to smooth transition is the perfectly symmetric equilibrium path.  Around an 
average transport cost of 2.5, the symmetric equilibrium ceases to exist and that path 
abruptly shifts to one of the stable paths that are converging towards agglomeration.  This 
shift is somewhat analogous to catastrophic agglomeration. 
 Agglomeration occurs because the consumer effect eventually dominates the 
profit effect for all entrepreneurs.  An entrepreneur considering relocating to the region 
with more firms must weigh the benefits of cheaper prices and lost profits.  As 
transportation costs decline, the profit differential between the two regions diminishes.  
This decline in lost profit from relocation causes the consumer welfare effect to become 
more important and locating near other firms becomes a net benefit for the entrepreneur.   
 Agglomeration evolves slowly and continuously in this model, as opposed to 
catastrophically, because the magnitudes of the two effects are different for each 
entrepreneur.  Because of transport cost differences, the consumer welfare effect 
overcomes the profit effect at different times for different entrepreneurs.  Thus, 
                                                 
10
 This result is not common for all distributions of transport costs.  The shape of the equilibrium path can 
be quasi-concave, quasi-convex or linear.  However, when transport costs are uniformly distributed, results 
are always similar to those in Figure 1. 
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entrepreneurs find it optimal to relocate to the agglomeration region at different levels of 
transport cost.    
IV.c.  Spatial sorting 
Though the spatial distribution of firms is an important result and the focus of 
most NEG literature, my model shows that a firm’s transport cost directly influences their 
location decision.  In order to understand the location decisions of an individual firm, we 
must look at the disaggregated results of an equilibrium path.  Figure 2 shows the 
location of every firm for an entire equilibrium path.  The leftmost column is the firm 
number.  The top row is the base transport cost.  A firm’s total transport cost is equal to 
the base transport cost plus 0.01 times one minus the firm number.  The number 1 
indicates that that firm is located in Home and 0 indicates Foreign.  I have also shaded the 
foreign cells grey to make the patterns easier to see.    
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Firm 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
36 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
40 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
42 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
44 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
46 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
48 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
52 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
54 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
56 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
58 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
62 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
64 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
68 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
72 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
73 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
74 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
76 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
78 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
80 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
82 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
84 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
86 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
88 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
96 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
97 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
98 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
99 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Figure 2.  This figure shows firm location for an entire equilibrium path.  Home = 1 and Foreign = 0 
(and grey shaded).  A firm’s transport cost is equal to the base transport cost (top row) plus .01 times 
one minus the firm number (column 1).  
Base transport cost 
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As transport costs decrease, firms spatially sort themselves by transport cost.  This 
eventually leads to a bifurcation of firms, where one region is populated by the firms with 
the lowest transport cost and the other region has the remaining high cost firms.  In figure 
2, firms are sorted by a base transport cost of 2.2.   Firms do not sort themselves 
immediately while still at high average transportation costs and the sorting happens at 
different transport costs for different equilibrium paths.  All stable equilibrium paths are 
sorted.  However, unstable equilibria do exist in which firms are sorted (at high average 
transport costs).  In figure 2, the distribution at base transport cost 2.2 is unstable, but is 
stable by 2.1.  Around the same time as equilibrium paths converge to one another, the 
complete sorting occurs.  Sorting and convergence do not necessarily occur together and 
do not happen at the same transport cost for all equilibrium paths.   
Figure 2 also demonstrates two more results.  First, once the firms are sorted, they 
stay sorted as transport costs decline.  This implies that the firm with the lowest relative 
transport cost in the high transport cost region will be the first to relocate when transport 
costs fall.  Second, the region which establishes itself as the low transport cost region 
(Home, in figure 2) will eventually be the region of agglomeration.  
 Spatial sorting occurs because each firm faces the same location problem and the 
relative importance of the consumer effect and the profit effect are similar for firms with 
similar transport costs; thus, they will likely locate in the same region.  There are no 
externalities or other means by which firms with like transport costs benefit from locating 
near each other.  As discussed in the introduction, heterogeneities often serve as 
dispersion forces in NEG models.  In this model, the heterogeneities affect how 
agglomeration happens, but not if it happens.  
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 Agglomeration develops in the low transport cost region because the low 
transport cost firms are better able to maintain profits when local competition is strong.  
Low transport cost firms use exports to compensate for lost domestic profit due to greater 
competition.  However, high transport cost firms can not export cheaply and are best off 
locating where fewer firms exist in order to capitalize on local demand.  The demand 
function is increasing in the price index, so by locating in a region with a high price 
index, a firm makes its own product more attractive to local consumers.  This logic also 
explains why relatively lower transport cost firms in the non-agglomeration region 
relocate to the agglomeration region before the relatively higher transport cost firms.  
The fact that the larger region contains the low transport cost firms somewhat 
contests Amiti (1998).  Her model shows that when two regions are of a different size 
and there are two industries with different transport costs, the high transport cost industry 
disproportionately locates in the large region.  There are many differences between the 
models, critical being that there is no agglomeration in Amiti (1998)11 and the size of the 
regions develops endogenously in my model.  With no agglomeration, firms will always 
face the same level of local competition and thus it is efficient for high transport cost 
firms to locate close to the larger source of demand.  With agglomeration, however, local 
competition will increase for some firms and I find that low transport cost firms are best 
able to cope with that competition.   
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                 
11
 Nor should there be agglomeration; Amiti (1998) is not a model of geography.  The reasons that 
agglomeration does not occur are 1) labor is immobile and 2) the returns to capital are spent where they are 
endowed.  
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 This model adds to the NEG literature by showing that NEG models can 
accommodate heterogeneous transport costs and these additions complement and enhance 
existing results.  The opposing motivations of the entrepreneurs and the heterogeneities 
of the model clearly explain the novel results.   
 Future work could go in several different directions.  Most interesting would be 
an empirical test of this model's predictions.  However, at least at the moment, this is 
subject to data limitations discussed in section 1.  On a theoretical front, it would be 
interesting to examine the effects of positive agricultural transport costs coupled with 
heterogeneous manufacturing transport costs, in line with Davis (1998).  Finally, any 
subsequent NEG model could incorporate heterogeneous transport costs as an additional 
level of realism, though this would almost certainly preclude analytical solutions.   
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Appendix 
 For all equilibrium paths shown in Figure 1, N=100.  For transport costs, I defined 
two parameters, a base transport cost and the range of transport costs, R.  From section 2, 
R/N is the difference between two consecutive firms’ transport costs.  To calculate an 
individual firm’s transport cost, the formula would be 
).1(*/cost)  transportbase( −+= iNRiτ   For example, if the base cost = 1 and R = 1, 
then firm 1’s cost would be 1.0, firm 2’s cost would be 1.01, firm 3’s cost would be 1.02 
and so on.  The results in the paper are presented in terms of average transport cost.  The 
average is simply calculated as (base transport cost) + .495*R. 
 When determining an equilibrium path, the base transport cost was decreased in 
increments of 0.1.  In two cases, 1) the symmetric equilibrium changing to a sorted path 
and 2) the point of complete agglomeration, I used increments of 0.01 to determine the 
exact point of occurrence. 
 The parameter for the equation of motion, θ, was set equal to 0.1, meaning a 
maximum of θ*N = 10 firms could relocate per iteration.  However, the simulation had 
trouble converging in some cases.  I set θ=0.1 conditional on being in the first 15 rounds 
of iteration, after that motion was restricted such that only one firm could move each 
round.  Most of the time, convergence would occur before this point.  The results were 
not meaningfully changed if a different value of θ is used as long as the additional 
restriction past 15 rounds is used.  For larger values of θ, there are some transport costs 
for which the program never converged without the additional restriction. 
 The specific values going into the results shown in Figure 1 and 2 are: 
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